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CASE COMMENTS
TRADEMARK LAW: WHEN ADDING ".COM" ADDS
DISTINCTIVENESS: PROVING SECONDARY MEANING FOR
DOMAIN NAME MARKS
In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
KatarzynaPabis*
Appellant Steelbuilding.com filed an intent-to-use application under
the Lanham Act to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM for services
in connection with the sale of pre-engineered metal buildings and roofing
systems.' The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) refused to
register the mark on the ground that the proposed mark was either generic
or merely descriptive and lacked secondary meaning.2 The Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the refusal, finding that the
addition of the top level domain (TLD) indicator ".com" did not have
source-identifying significance and that the evidence submitted to
establish secondary meaning was inadequate Appellant appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.4 The Federal Circuit vacated
the TTAB's determination as to genericness but ultimately affirmed the
denial of the application and HELD, the record was sufficient to show the
proposed mark was merely descriptive and Appellant did not meet its
burden of showing the mark acquired secondary meaning.5

* Winner of the Journalof Technology Law & Policy Fall 2005 Write-On Competition.
J.D., University of Florida, Levin College of Law 2006. I dedicate this Comment to my family and
friends for their continued love and encouragement, especially Ali and Ed for standing beside me
on this long journey.
1. In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see 15 U.S.C. §
1051 (b)(1) (2000).
2. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1296. Appellant filed an original application and an
amended application. Id. The USPTO rejected both applications. Id.
3. Id. (citing In Re Steelbuilding.com, 2003 WL 23350100 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2003)).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1298. The Federal Circuit found that the TTAB misunderstood the genus of
Appellant's goods and services and therefore vacated the TIAB's determination that the
"STEELBUILDING.COM" mark was generic. Id. The Federal Circuit also concluded that the
evidence in the record was insufficient to support a finding that the proposed mark was generic for
Appellant's services. Id. at 1299.
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Under the Lanham Act, a descriptive mark may be eligible for federal
trademark registration if it acquired secondary meaning.6 Similarly, a
descriptive domain name with acquired secondary meaning may be
afforded trademark protection.7 In order to demonstrate secondary
meaning, an applicant must show that the primary significance of the mark
to the relevant public is that it identifies the source of the goods or
services.' Courts have generally found that when examining domain name
marks, the addition of a TLD indicator to an otherwise generic or
descriptive term does not create source-identifying significance.'
The Federal Circuit addressed the application of a strict rule that
disregards the use of TLD indicators in evaluating the registerability of a
mark in In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP.' In Oppedahl, the appellant
owned a web site that showed the appellant offered software to track
patent applications and issued patents through the Internet. " The appellant
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000). Under trademark law, a mark is only entitled to
trademark protection if it is arbitrary, fanciful, or descriptive with secondary meaning. See 2 J.
THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:2 (4th ed.
2005). A merely descriptive term identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service and
is not afforded federal trademark protection absent a finding of secondary meaning. See
Steelbuilding.com., 415 F.3d at 1297.
7. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Examination Guide No. 299; Marks Composed, in Whole or in Part, of Domain Names [hereinafter Examination Guide],
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/ guide299.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
1999). The USPTO has issued guidelines on the registration of domain names as trademarks. See
id. The USPTO explains that a domain name is an address that identifies the location of a web site
on the Internet. See id. Generally, a domain name consists of a second-level domain (SLD), a "dot,"
then a top-level domain (TLD). See id. Thus, a TLD indicator is the portion of the domain name
to the right of the "dot." See id. Examples of TLD indicators include ".com, " ".net," ".org," and
".biz." See Examination Guide, supra. Under the USPTO guidelines, domain name marks are
entitled to registration in the Principal Register if they are arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, or
descriptive, with acquired secondary meaning. See id. Domain names that are merely descriptive
or generic do not qualify for registration. See id.
8. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982); see also Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (explaining that a mark has acquired
secondary meaning if a substantial segment of the population has come to view the mark as
denoting a single source of the product or service rather than merely providing information about
the product or service itself).
9. See In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re
Martin Container, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058, 1060 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (holding that ".com" has no
source identifying significance); In re CyberFinancial.Net, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789, 1792
(T.T.A.B. 2002) (finding that adding a TLD indicator to an otherwise unregisterable mark usually
does not make it registerable).
10. Oppedahl, 373 F.3d at 1173.
11. Id. at 1172.

CASE COMMENT

challenged the TTAB's decision affirming the USPTO's refusal to register
the mark PATENTS.COM based on a finding that the mark was merely
descriptive.' 2
The Federal Circuit concluded that the USPTO "has not applied a
bright-line rule that the addition of a TLD [indicator] to an otherwise
descriptive term will never under any circumstances affect the
registratibility of a mark."' 3 In examining domain name marks, the court
held that the USPTO must consider the TLD indicator and assess the
commercial impression of the mark in its entirety.14 The court also held
that the addition of a TLD indicator may operate to create a distinctive
mark in exceptional circumstances. 5 In this case, however, the court
reasoned that the mark PATENTS.COM described patent-related goods in
connection with the Internet and that combining the terms only increased
the mark's level of descriptiveness. 6
Courts have generally found that the more descriptive a mark, the more
evidence is required to prove that the mark acquired secondary meaning.' 7
The Federal Circuit identified six factors to help establish secondary
meaning in Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group." In
Cicena,the plaintiff, the manufacturer of a clear plastic neon-lit telephone
called the ROXANNE telephone, brought suit against the defendant, a
manufacturer of novelty telephones that developed a similar phone for

12. Id. The Federal Circuit solely reviewed the TIAB's finding as to descriptiveness because
the appellant did not claim the mark acquired secondary meaning. Id. at 1174.
13. Id. at 1175.
14. Id. at 1177.
15. Oppedahl,373 F.3d at 1177. To demonstrate that a TLD could affect the descriptiveness
of a mark, the Federal Circuit used the hypothetical mark TENNIS.NET for a store that sells tennis
nets but does no business on the Internet. See id. at 1175.
16. Id. at 1177. The Federal Circuit found combining "PATENTS" with ".COM" only
increased the level of descriptiveness of the PATENTS.COM. mark. Id.
17. In re Bongrain Int'l Am.Corp., 894 F.2d 1316, 1317 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Yamaha
Int'l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the more
descriptive a mark, the heavier the burden on the mark owner to show it acquired secondary
meaning)).
18. Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecomms. Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Elements relevant to determining secondary meaning include (1) copying; (2) advertising
expenditures; (3) sales success; (4) length and exclusivity of use; (5) unsolicited media coverage;
and (6) consumer studies. Id. Of these factors, no single factor is dispositive and each factor does
not need to be considered to show secondary meaning. SeeIn re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293,
1300 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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unfair competition. 9 The district court granted the plaintiff a preliminary
injunction from infringing on its trade dress.2°
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding of secondary meaning.2 The circuit court,
in considering the relevant factors, held that there was not enough
evidence and vacated the district court's grant of the injunction.22 The
circuit court reasoned that while the ROXANNE telephone achieved
commercial success, such success was most likely attributable to the fact
that the public viewed the ROXANNE telelphone as aesthetically
pleasing.23 The circuit court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's
advertising expenditures or the complete lack of any consumer studies that
linked the ROXANNE telephone design to a source.24
In determining whether a descriptive domain name mark has acquired
secondary meaning to Internet users, courts in other jurisdictions have
applied a variation of the six factor test used by the Federal Circuit.25 In
DeGidio v. West Group Corp., the Sixth Circuit considered whether there
was sufficient evidence to show that the descriptive mark
LAWOFFICES.NET acquired secondary meaning.2 6 In DeGidio, the
plaintiff owned the proposed mark LAWOFFICES.NET for use in
connection with a web site which provided a searchable online database
of attorneys and related legal information.27 The plaintiff brought suit
19. Cicena,900 F.2d at 1547-48.
20. Id. at 1548.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1551-52.
23. Id. at 1551. The plaintiff sold 40,000 telephones in 1988 and projected 60,000 phones to
be sold in 1989. Id. at 1547. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district judge's finding that a
person does not choose to purchase one phone over another because he thinks the phone is more
reliable since it is made by a more reliable source. See id. at 1551. The Federal Circuit also found
that any media coverage received by the ROXANNE brand was similarly attributable. Id.
24. Cicena,900 F.2d at 1551-52. The plaintiff spent $360,000 on advertising and promotion
in 1988 and expected to exceed $1,000,000 in 1989. Id. at 1547. The Federal Circuit also
considered the short eighteen-month time period in which the ROXANNE telephone was on the
market and the existence of other similar competing telephone designs. Id. at 1552. Such evidence
indicated secondary meaning was not established. Id.The existence of similar phones on the market
make it less likely that consumers will make an association between a single phone and a single
manufacturer. Id.
25. See DeGidio v. W. Group Corp., 355 F.3d 506, 513 n.15 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing a
seven-factor test for evaluating secondary meaning); BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 202-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying a six-factor test for secondary meaning
used by the Second Circuit and holding that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden in showing that
the descriptive mark BIGSTAR.COM acquired secondary meaning).
26. DeGidio, 355 F.3d at 513.
27. Id. at 508.
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against the defendant, a corporation that marketed its online legal
information database under the name LAWOFFICE.COM, for unfair
competition." The district court, in applying the seven-factor test for
secondary meaning used by the Sixth Circuit, granted summary judgment
for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's descriptive mark did not
acquire secondary meaning.2 9
The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. 3° The DeGidio court held that the evidence was insufficient to

show secondary meaning. 3' The common use of the phrase "law office,"
inadequate advertising expenditures, and poor sales revenues weighed
against a finding of secondary meaning. 32 The DeGidio court noted a
complete absence of any consumer survey evidence demonstrating that
consumers view the domain name mark as a source identifier.3 3 Further,
the DeGidio court stated that mere use of a web site by consumers does not
establish identification with a unique source. 34 After reviewing each of the
factors, the DeGidio court found the mark LAWOFFICES.NET was
unregisterable. 35 DeGidio illustrates the Sixth Circuit's application of the
traditional secondary meaning analysis to a domain name mark.36
In the instant case, the Federal Circuit extended its prior decision in
Oppedahl regarding the use of TLD indicators and used the traditional
factor test to review evidence of acquired secondary meaning.37 The
Federal Circuit reviewed the TTAB's holding that the mark
STEELBUILDING.COM is generic or descriptive for substantial
evidence.38 Vacating the TTAB's finding as to genericness, the instant
court found that the addition of ".COM" actually expanded the meaning

28. Id.
29. Id. at 509. The seven factors used by the Sixth Circuit in considering whether a mark
acquired secondary meaning include (1) direct consumer testimony; (2) consumer surveys; (3)
exclusivity, length, and manner of use; (4) amount and manner of advertising; (5) amount of sales
and number of customers; (6) established place in the market; and (7) proof of intentional copying.
Id. at 513 n.15.
30. Id. at 509.
31. DeGidio,355 F.3d at 514.
32. Id. at 513.
33. Id.
34. Id. The plaintiff provided affidavits of three people who visited the plaintiff's web site.
Id.
35. Id. at 513-14.
36. DeGidio, 355 F.3d at 513-14.
37. See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
38. Id. at 1296.
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of"steelbuilding" to include services beyond the sale of steel buildings.39
However, since the TLD indicator primarily described the Internet
commerce connection of Appellant's services, the Federal Circuit
sustained the TTAB's finding that the STEELBUILDING.COM mark was
merely descriptive and turned to the issue of secondary meaning.4"
The instant court applied the factors cited in Cicena to review the
TTAB's finding that the STEELBUILDING.COM mark did not acquire
secondary meaning.41 The TTAB found Appellant's advertising
expenditures were inadequate and noted its primary use of Internet banner
advertisements.42 The TTAB also found that Appellant's Internet poll on
domain name recognition was not sufficiently reliable to be considered
evidence of acquired secondary meaning.4 3 Finally, the TTAB concluded
Appellant's other evidence was insufficient and noted that although people
may occasionally recognize "STEELBUILDING.COM" as a mark, "much
of this evidence may be attributable to domain name recognition." Based
on this evidence, the instant court sustained the TTAB's finding of no
acquired secondary meaning and affirmed the denial of the registration
application.45 Judge Linn, dissenting in part, reasoned that the fact that the
mark is also a domain name did not give the TTAB a legal basis to
discount evidence of secondary meaning." The focus of the instant case
is whether the STEELBUILDING.COM mark functions as a source
indicator.47

39. Id. at 1299. The Federal Circuit concluded that the TLD expanded the mark to include
the Internet services that consist of designing steel buildings on the web site and then calculating
a price for the design before ordering it. Id. Summarily, the Federal Circuit found the TTAB was
incorrect in (1) construing the genus of Appellant's goods and services; (2) not taking the multiple
meanings of the mark into account; and (3) dismissing the TLD indicator. Id.
40. Id. at 1300. The Federal Circuit found that the sale of steel buildings continued to be a
significant feature of Appellant's services. Id. at 1299.
41. Id. at 1300; see Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecomms. Group, 900 F.2d 1546,1551 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
42. Steelbuilding.com,415 F.3d at 1300. The Federal Circuit stated that the TTAB considered
evidence of print and Internet advertising, affidavits from employees and competitors, commercial
success data, web site traffic data, and communications from customers. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.at 1301.
46. Id. (Linn, J., dissenting). Judge Linn concluded that the Federal Circuit should vacate the
TTAB's determination of no acquired secondary meaning and remand for further consideration.
Id. (Linn, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
47. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301 (Linn, J.,
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Prior to the Federal Circuit's decision in Oppedahl, the USPTO
generally dismissed TLD indicators when evaluating the distinctiveness
of domain name marks.48 Oppedahl introduced the notion that adding
".com" to a term that is not distinctive could potentially create sourceidentifying significance.4 9 In the instant case, the court reaffirmed prior
legal principles regarding the use of TLDs.5 ° The instant court, however,
also went a step further than prior law by actually finding that the word
"steelbuilding" acquired some additional meaning from the addition of the
".com" portion." Although the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the
TTAB's finding that the STEELBUILDING.COM mark was
unregisterable, the court's decision is significant because it may force the
TTAB and other courts to look at TLD indicators more carefully in the
future.52 In particular, future decisions may clarify when a TLD indicator
does in fact make a term distinctive enough for registration. 3
While the instant court provides a thorough discussion of TLD
indicators, the analysis of the evidence submitted for secondary meaning
is more limited. Citing the six-factor test used by the Cicena court, the
instant court, like the DeGidio court, attempted to apply traditional
secondary meaning principles to the area of domain name marks.54 In
Cicena and DeGidio, both courts systematically examined each of the
relevant factors in reviewing the district court's assessment of the
evidence.55 The instant court, unlike the courts in Cicena and DeGidio,
referred to only a few of the factors in its analysis. 6 The court's opinion
is brief, offering limited insight into its analysis of the instant case.57 The
court only noted the TTAB's assessment of Appellant's advertising

48. See In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173-74 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal
Circuit in Oppedahlstated that the USPTO must evaluate the commercial impression of a domain
name mark in its entirety when it considers the mark's registerability. See id. at 1177.
49. See id.
50. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1297.
51. Id. at 1299.
52. See id. at l301.
53. See id. at 1297.
54. See id. at 1300; DeGidio v. W. Group Corp., 355 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2004); Cicena
Ltd. v. Columbia Telecomms. Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
55. See DeGidio, 355 F.3d at 513-14; Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1551-52.
56. See Steelbuilding.com,415 F.3d at 1300; DeGidio,355 F.3d at 513-14; Cicena,900 F.2d
at 1551-52.
57. See Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300.
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expenditures and Internet poll.58 Therefore, it is unclear from the decision
how the TTAB weighed the remaining evidence submitted by Appellant.59
In weighing the evidence, however, the TTAB may have overlooked
the significance of the mark's connection to the Internet. 60 The dissent
argues that the TTAB did not give Appellant's evidence of Internet
advertising expenditures enough weight. 6' Due to its unique ability to
target a specific audience, Internet advertising has become a cost-effective
alternative to traditional forms of advertising.62 In the instant case, the
dissent maintains that Appellant's Internet advertising generated site
traffic, which caused Internet consumers to make an association between
Appellant's services and its mark.63
Appellant in the instant case, unlike the appellant in DeGidio, also
submitted affidavits from competitors and other relevant individuals
demonstrating that individuals view the STEELBUILDING.COM mark as
distinctive. 64 The TTAB gave little weight to this evidence, however,
stating that "much of [the] evidence may be attributable to domain name
recognition.,, 65 The TTAB's analysis seems inconsistent with the court's
analysis in DeGidio.6 6 For instance, in assessing whether the mark
LAWOFFICES.NET acquired secondary meaning, the court in DeGidio
demanded consumer survey evidence demonstrating that Internet users

58. Id.
59. See id. at 1301 (Linn, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion expresses concern that the
TrAB did not consider some of the evidence of secondary meaning. Id. at 1301-03 (Linn, J.,
dissenting). Appellant submitted evidence that 200 new users and 200 repeat users logged into its
web site each day to request a price quote. Id. at 1302 (Linn, J., dissenting). Appellant also
submitted evidence that its sales success increased from $500,000 in the first four months the mark
was in use, to $4,500,000 over the following seven-month period. Id. at 1303 (Linn, J., dissenting).
As the TTAB never discussed this evidence, the dissent states it is difficult to determine whether
the TI'AB considered it. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1303 (Linn, J., dissenting).
60. See id.
at 1300.
61. Id.at 1302 (Linn, J., dissenting). The TTAB found Appellant's advertising expenditures
to be unpersuasive, noting Appellant primarily used Internet banner advertisements. Id. at 1300.
Appellant submitted evidence that in 2001, it spent $99,000 on Internet advertising and $98,000
on print advertising. Id. at 1302 (Linn, J., dissenting). Appellant purchased Internet banner ads and
pay-per-performance ads. Id. (Linn, J., dissenting). Generally, the success of Internet advertising
rates is measured by the "click-through" rate. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1302 (Linn, J.,
dissenting). Appellant submitted evidence demonstrating that its banner ads appeared 75,000 times
per month, with a click-through rate as high as 8%. Id. (Linn, J., dissenting).
62. See Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1302-03 (Linn, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1302 (Linn, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1301 (Linn, J., dissenting); DeGidio v. W. Group Corp., 355 F.3d 506,513 (6th Cir.
2004).
65. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301 (Linn, J., dissenting).
66. See id.at 1301 (Linn, J., dissenting); DeGidio, 355 F.3d at 513-14.
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link the domain name to a particular source.67 While DeGidio is not
controlling in the instant case, the court's analysis represents the
importance of tailoring traditional secondary meaning principles to the
Internet world.68
Relying on Oppedahl, the dissent points out that the issue before the
TTAB was whether the STEELBUILDING.COM mark identified
Appellant as the source of Appellant's interactive steelbuilding services in
the eyes of consumers.69 In the Internet world, there are millions of domain
names and corresponding web sites, all trying to catch the consumer's eye.
Domain name recognition may be evidence that a domain name mark
acquired secondary meaning.7 ° In light of this reasoning, the TTAB may
not have given enough weight to the evidence submitted by Appellant.71
The instant court, however, deferred to the findings of the TTAB on this
issue.72 Accordingly, the instant court found Appellant did not meet its
burden of showing that the descriptive domain name mark
acquired secondary meaning in the eyes of
STEELBUILDING.COM
73
consumers.
The instant case demonstrates the difficulties modem courts encounter
when they apply traditional trademark law to the complex forum of
cyberspace. Only a small percentage of the millions of domain names on
the Intemet actually qualify as trademarks. 74 The instant case involved a
situation where the owner of a descriptive domain name mark was faced
with the rigorous burden of proving the mark was distinctive enough to
qualify for federal trademark protection.75
As one commentator suggests, the complex nature of the Internet itself
may make it more difficult for the owners of descriptive domain name
marks to prove their mark acquired secondary meaning in the eyes of
67. See DeGidio,355 F.3d at 513-14; see also BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105
F. Supp. 2d 185, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that the plaintiff did not do a consumer survey for
secondary meaning that shows consumers linked the domain name "bigstar.com" to a particular
source).
68. SeeDeGidio, 355 F.3d at 513-14.
69. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301 (Linn, J., dissenting); see also In re Oppedahl &
Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
70. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301 (Linn, J., dissenting); see also Brookfield
Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
domain names can be powerful source indicators on the Internet).
71. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301 (Linn, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1300.
73. Id. at 1301.
74. 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §

7:17:1 (4th ed. 2005).
75. See Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301.
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Internet users.76 For example, by typing a descriptive keyword into a
search engine, an Internet user can easily retrieve a web site by its
descriptive name, making it difficult to prove the domain name acquired
any distinctiveness." While the instant case is consistent with previous
Federal Circuit decisions, the case emphasizes that the TTAB and other
courts must carefully weigh the evidence in examining the extent to which
a mark owner has influenced the Internet and its mark's domain name
status to acquire secondary meaning."
Finally, in finding that a domain name mark acquired additional
meaning from a TLD indicator, the instant court's decision may have a
profound impact on trademark law.79 In the future, it will be interesting to
see the circumstances in which adding a TLD indicator does in fact make
a mark distinctive enough for trademark registration.

76.
Right, 56
77.
78.
79.

See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffery A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 54 (2004).
See id. at 54-55.
See Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1303 (Linn, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1299.

